Homicide -- Effect on Wrongdoer\u27s Inheritance, Intestate and Survivorship Rights by Ague, Estelle L.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
6-1-1953
Homicide -- Effect on Wrongdoer's Inheritance,
Intestate and Survivorship Rights
Estelle L. Ague
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Estelle L. Ague, Homicide -- Effect on Wrongdoer's Inheritance, Intestate and Survivorship Rights, 7 U. Miami L. Rev. 524 (1953)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol7/iss4/8
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
HOMICIDE-EFFECT ON WRONGDOER'S INHERITANCE,
INTESTATE AND SURVIVORSHIP RIGHTS
Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria,1 the ageless
maxim that "no man shall profit by his own misdeed" 2 finds itself in a
precarious position when considering the rights of a murderer to inherit
either from his slain ancestor or from his murdered spouse, particularly in
cases of tenancy by the entiety. There are three lines of decisions defining
the slayer's position in succeeding to the property of the ancestor he so
designedly dispatched. 8
MURDER OF ANCESTOR
View I
The murderer or those claiming under him are not barred from taking
by will or descent from the murdered person.4 The legal title passes to the
murderer and may be retained by him in spite of his crime.
This rule finds its inception in the theory that the public
policy of a state is found in its constitution, its statutory enact-
ments and its judicial records; and where the intestate law casts
the estate of a deceased person upon designated persons this is
absolute and peremptory, and no rule of public policy can take
it away from the persons designated by statute and give it to
others even for the reason that the designated person killed the
intestate, without a violation of the statute.6
Those states that adhere to this rule subject the common law policy -
prohibiting inheritance of property by descent, by distribution, or by virtue
of marital rights from one whose death is caused by or results from the
heir's felonious act7 - to complete control by statues of descent and distri-
bution.8
It has been held that denying the murderer his property would be
violative of specific state constitutional limitations protecting inheritance
1. 2 Co. LITT. *148(b).
2. 2 DOMAT'S CIVIL LAW 80 (Cushings ed. 1853); ConE NAPOLEON, § 727;
BROOM's LEGAL MAXIMS 279 (8th ed. 1882).
3. Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire Title By His Own Crime and Keep It?, Am.
L. Rsc. (N.S.) 235 (1897); Thomas, Public Policy as Affecting Property Rights Accru-
ing to a Party as a Result of Wrongful Acts, 1 CALIf. L. REv. 397 (1913); Note,
30 NEB. L. REV. 601 (1951).
4. In re Kirby's Estate, 162 Cal. 91, 121 Pac. 370 (1912); Wall v. Pfanschmidt,
265 III. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); Bruns v. Cope, 182 Ind. 289, 105 N.E. 471
1914); Kuhn v. Kuhn, 125 Iowa 449, 101 N.W. 151 (1904); McAllister v. Fair,
2 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Collnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349, 128 N.W. 292(1910); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W. 935 (1894); Owens v.
Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888); Deem v. Milliken, 6 Ohio C. C. 357
(1892), aff'd 53 Ohio St. 668, 44 N.E. 1134 (1895); Holloway v. McCormick, 41
Okla. 1, 136 Pac, 1111 (1913); Carpenter's Estate, 70 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895);
Hill v. Noland, 149 S.W. 288 (Tex. 1912).
5. Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W. 935 (1894); Carpenter's
Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 AtI. 637 (1895).
6. Wall %. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914).
7. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
8. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 187 (1937) (acquisition of property by
murderer).
COMMENTS
to an heir, and preventing corruption of blood.9 Furthermore, it has been
argued that denial of the inheritance is punishment for the crime in
addition to that prescribed by criminal law.'9 In these jurisdictions, there
is a rigid adherence to the written word despite its inadequacies and gross
inequities. Where the statute specifically states to whom the estate is to
descend, no question of policy, good or bad, arises. The legal title is
immediately vested in the heir. The courts shut their eyes to the manner
in which the heir brought about this shift of title. They claim to be hound
by legislative enactments. If there is to be a change, the courts place the
burden upon the legislature. Until such time as the legislatures choose
to alleviate this condition, the operation of the statutes of succession will
continue to be unaffected even though the death was caused by the heir.
View I
Legal title to an estate will not pass to a murderer even though the
statutes of succession are clear and unambiguous." The murderer can
take nothing.1 2 His acthas barred him from ever acquiring title to the
property.' 3 Where the murderer is a beneficiary of a will, the killing of
the testator does not render the will invalid,' 4 but makes the testamentary
gift inoperative only as to the murdering beneficiary.' 5 This rule is based
on the common law tenet that no man shall profit by his own wrong, or
found any claim upon his own iniquity."0 The public policy that no
murderer, or his heirs, can take property by will or otherwise from his
victim,' 7 is so strong that the rules of title are modified.'8  The courts
express the opinion that it is better to legislate judicially than to allow the
killer to enrich himself unjustly.' The decisions handed down in these
9. Welsh v. James, 408 Iii. 18, 95 NE.2d 872 (1950); Hodapp v. Oleff, 40
Ohio L. R. 209 (App. 1934), aff'd 129 Ohio St. 432, 196 N.E. 838 (1935); Car-
penter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Att. 637 (1895); 1 STINsON, AMNERICAr STArUTE LAw
379 (1886).
10. Welsh v. James, 408 111. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950).
11. Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire Title By His Own Crime and Keep It?, 36
A . L. RF.. (N.S.) 235 (1897); Note, I CALIP. L. Rrv. 397 (1913).
12. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889); Cleaver v. Mutual
Reserve Fund Life Association, I Q. B. 147 (1892).
13. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908).
14. Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 151, 42 N.E. 540, 542 (1896).
15. In re Wilkins, 192 Vis. 111, 211 N.W. 652 (1927).
16. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Riggs v. Palmers,
115 N.Y. 560, 22 N.E. 188 (1889); In re Wolf, 88 Misc. 433, 150 N.Y. Supp. 738
(Surr. Ct. 1914); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S\., 1042 (1903); Cleaver v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, [1892] 1 Q. B. 147; In re Crippen, [1911]
27 Times Law Reports 258; Lundy v. Lundy, 127 Can. S, C. 650 (1895); In re
Cash, 30 N. Z. L. R. 577 (1911).
17. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Box v. Lanier,
112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.V. 1042 (1903); In re Wilkins 192 Wis. 111, 2 N.V. 652
(1927).
18. Courts agree that beneficiary cannot maintain action for insurance proceeds
after murdering insured. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886);
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Weigbtman, 61 Okla. 106, 160 Pac. 629 (1916).
19. Comment, 30 NEB. L. REv. 601 (1951).
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jurisdictions form a direct antithesis to those cited in the former group. 20
View III
The legal title passes to the murderer subject to a constructive trust
in favor of those who would take in the event of his disqualification.2 1
Although the legal title must vest in the slayer, circumstances bring it
within the province of equity to deprive him of its beneficial use.2  This
method appears to be midway between two diametrically opposed views.
The statutory law is not disturbed since the legal title vests immediately
in the slayer. However, public policy against the murderer finds a proper
outlet in the courts of equity. Equity provides a solution which alleviates
the fears of the strict constructionists, yet satisfies the common law doc-
trine by not allowing the wrongdoer to enjoy that which he has brought
about by unconscionable means.
Legislative Hodge-Podge
In an attempt to remedy the diversity of decisions and to stabilize
the status of the murderer, a number of state legislatures have enacted
statutes. 23 These statutes differ in context. A few eliminate the murderer
both as a devisee -or legatee and as an heir.24  The remaining statutes are
broader in scope. Some bar the slayer from receiving any interest by
intestacy, will, deed or otherwise;25 or preclude the murderer from taking
as a surviving spouse by operation or law, or by virtue of a marriage settle-
ment;21 or prevent the killer from obtaining any interests by intestacy, by
will, or as surviving spouse.2T Still others will not allow the wrongdoer
to take by intestacy, will or otherwise;28 by intestacy, will or remainder-
man;20 or by intestacy, will, remainderman or otherwise. 0 A majority of
20. Cf. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 43 (1921).
21. 4 PoMEROY, EQ. JUss. §§ 1044, 1054d (5th ed. 1941); Chadwick, A Tes-
tator's Bounty to His Slayer, 30 L. Q. R. 211 (1914); Comment, 29 MicH. L. REV.
745 (1931); Comment, 30 NEB. L. REV. 601 (1951); Comment, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV.
492 (1931); Note, 44 HAsV. L. REv. 125 (1930); Note, 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 100
(l930 : Whitney v. Lott, 134 N.J. Eq. 586, 36 A.2d 888 (Ch. 1944); In re San-
tourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1925).
23. CAL. PROB. ConE § 258 (1949); CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 176, § 12 (1935);
FLA. STAT. § 731.31 (1951); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 3, § 167 (1941); IND. ANN. STAT. §
6-2352 (Burns 1933); IowA CODE c. 636, §§ 47, 48, 49 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT.§ 22-133 (1949); LA. Civ. CODE arts. 966, 1560, 1710 (1947); MINN. STAT. § 525.87
(1949); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 479, 672 (1942); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-119, 30-120
1948); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-10, 30-4, 52-19 (1950); N. D. REV. CODE § 56-0423
(1943; OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (1941); ORE. CODE ANN. § 10-213 (1913); PA.
STAT. Am. tit. 20, §§ 1.6, 3441, 3442, 3443, 3444, 3445, 3446, 3447, 3448, 3449,
3450, 3451, 3452, 3453, 3454, 3456 (1952); S. C. CODE § 19-5 (1952); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 8388, 8395 (Williams 1934); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-3-22 (1953); VA. CODE§ 64-18 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4095 (1949); WYO. CoMP. STAT. ANN. §
6-2518 (1945); D. C. CODE ANN. § 18-109 (1951).
24. Indiana, Nebraska, Virginia, Wyoming.
25. Kansas, Tennessee.
26. North Carolina.
27. Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania.
28. Colorado, North Dakota, Utah.
29. District of Columbia.
30. South Carolina.
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these statutes require a conviction of crime as described in the statute.31
In a small number of states no conviction is required. 2 The constitu-
tionality of these enactments has been upheld by the courts.33
MURDER OF SPOUSE
A similar problem arises where one causes or procures the death of
a spouse. In the absence of a statute expressly governing, the courts
differ as to whether one who feloniously takes the life of his spouse is
entitled to succeed to the latter's estate. a" Even where applicable statutes
do exist, there is no uniformity.
In some states where a conviction is required to create a forfeiture
of the inheritance, manslaughter will suffice; 5 in others, proof of murder
is essential." In one case where the surviving- spouse was not convicted,
but was committed to a state hospital for the insane, the survivor was
excluded from the inheritance.37  In another case, the conclusion of a
coroner's jury that the defendant murdered the deceased did not satisfy
the statute. 8  Furthermore, conviction of murder in another state was
held not to create a forfeiture of the inheritance.39 A kaleidoscope of
views, interpretations, constructions and decisions exists.
Further complications occur in private litigation. It is a rule of policy
that, when an accusation of crime is involved in concurrent criminal and
civil actions, the civil trial will be suspended until determination of the
criminal prosecution. 0 Yet, the conviction would not be the legal fact
of the murder in a civil action between private litigants. 4' Nor is the
record of the conviction admissible in evidence to establish the truth of
the facts on which the conviction was had.42 Truly, confusion reigns.
31. California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah.
32. Iowa, Minnesota. Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Wyoming.
33. In re Kirby, 162 Cal. 91, 121 Pac. 370 (1912); In re Mertes, 181 Ind, 478,
104 N.E. 753 (1914); In re Emerson, 191 Iowa 900, 183 N.W. 327 (1921); Hamblin
v Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 Pac. 678 (1918), aff'd 104 Kan. 689, 180 Pac. 811
(1919); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Beddingfield v.
Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 SYW. 108 (1907).
34. Not entitled: Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So.2d 525 (1945); Price v.
litaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 Atl. 470 (1933); Slocum v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 245
Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816 (1923); Bierbrauer v. Moran. 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y.
Supp. 176 (4th Dep't 1935); In re Sparks' Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926
(Surr. Ct. 1939); Parker v. Potter, 200 N. C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1931).
Entitled: Smith v. Greenberg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950); Cnimley v.
Hall, 202 Ga. 588, 43 S.E.2d 646 (1947); Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d
872 (1950); Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 Pae. 1111 (1913).
35. Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 Pae. 678 (1918), aff'd 104 Kan. 689,
180 Pac. 811 1919).
36. In re Lysholm's Estate, 79 Cal. App. 2d 467, 179 P.2d 833 (1947).
37. In re 1toffman's Estate, 39 Pa. D.&C. 208 (1941).
38. Hogg v. Whitham, 120 Kan. 341, 242 Pac. 1021 (1926); Smith v. Todd,
155 S.C. 323, 152 S.Eo 506 (1930).
39. Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 Fed. 776 (8th Cir. 1920).
40. Matter of Fleming, 16 Misc. 442, 38 N.Y. Stipp. 611 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
41. In re Johnston's Estate, 220 Iowa 328, 261 N.W. 908 (1935); Goodwin v.
Continental Cas. Co., 175 Okla. 469, 53 P.2d 241 (1936).
42. Sorbello v. Mangino, 108 N.J. Eq. 292, 294, 155 Atl. 6, 8 (Ch. 1931);
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ESTATES BY TilE E'rrIRETY
So far we have been concerned with the murdering spouse's right to
inherit from his or her victim. A situation may exist, however, where
the question is not one of inheriting from the deceased spouse, but
rather of taking as the surviving spouse. 48  Where this occurs, statutes
barring a murderer from inheriting from his spouse are obviously of no
avail and do not apply.44  This occurs where husband and wife hold
property as tenants by the entirety. The essential characteristic of an
estate by the entirety is that each spouse is seized of the whole or entirety,
and not of a share, moiety, or divisible part 5.4  Upon the death of one
spouse the estate continues in the survivor.40  The survivor does not
inherit the interest of the other, but merely comes into the full beneficial
enjoyment of such estate. 47  Nothing passes. "The survivor takes no new
estate or interest - nothing that was not in him or her before ....,,4 but
by a condition in law the one who lives longer takes the entire estate.40
There are four distinct approaches to the effect of murder of one's
spouse upon an estate by the entirety. The first three are similar in essence
to decisions governing the succession of property to one murdering an
ancestor. The fourth is a recent decision - a solution peculiar to and
pertaining only to dissolution of estates by the entirety.
View I
The legal title vests in the murderer as the survivor in fact, as well as
in law, by virtue of the nature of an estate by the entirety.?' The devolution
of the property in cases of tenancy by the entirety is controlled by the
nature of the estate as originally created.5 ' The fact of death is the con-
trolling factor; the cause of death is of no consequence.52  The courts
following this view have held that the common law rules barring a
murderer from inheriting do not apply, as the murdering survivor becomes
vested of the entire estate under the "conveyance", and not by inheritance
from or through the murdered spouse.;,-' They stress the bare words of
the common law doctrine rather than the basic theory embodied within
those words. In Sorbello v. Mangino, 4 the first case of its kind to arise in
Kowalski v. Director General, 93 N.I.L. 340, 107 Atl. 477 (1919), afi'd 96 N.J.L.
293, 114 Atl. 927 (1921).
43. Stelz v. Shrcck, 128 N.Y. 263, 28 N.E. 510 (1891); Davis v. Bass, 188
N.C. 208, 124 S.E. 566 (1924); Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa. 397 (1865); Corinth v.
Emery, 63 Vt. 505, 22 At. 618 (1891); Butoy, REAL PROPERTY §§ 208, 209 (1943).
44. Beddingfield v. Estill and Newman, 118 Tean. 39, 100 SW. 108 (1907).
45. Andrews %. Andrews, 155 Hla. 654, 21 So.2d 205 (1945).
46. Johnson v. Lusk, 46 Tenn. 115, 98 Am. Dec. 445 (1868); Co. LITT. *187(b);
2 BL. COMM. *182; 2 KErC, CO MENTARIES *132.
47. Knapp v. Fredricksen, 148 la. 311, 4 So.2d 251 (1941).
48. Co. LIr. "234(b).
49. johnson v. Lisk, 46 'enn. 115, 98 An. Dec. 445 (1868).
50. Supra note 44.
51. Sorbello v. Mangino, 108 N.J. Eq. 292, 294, 155 Atl. 6, 8 (1931).
52. Note, 30 NEe. L. Rsv. 601 (1951).
53. Supra note 44.
54. 108 N.J. Eq. 292, 155 Atl. 6 (Ch. 1931).
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New Jersey, the court presented this query: "Can a murderer acquire
property by or as a consequence of his crime and keep it?"55 The reply,
until the legislature enacts a statute to the contrary, will remain in the
affirmative. The courts in these "letter of the law" jurisdictions will do
nothing to alleviate this gross injustice to the murdered spouse's heirs.
There is a complete and utter refusal to interfere with the operation of
law l0 which vests the estate in the survivor.
View II
Neither the legal nor the equitable title to the victim's property can
be acquired by the slayer.57 Equitable rules and principles, based on com-
mon law and civil law theory that one who procures the death of another
is unworthy of succeeding to his estate,58 provide the justification for this
view. Although the crime was not committed for the purpose of acquir-
ing property, the courts may deprive the murderer of the estate. 9 The
presumption arises that the victim would have outlived the.slayer. 0  The
murdering spouse is considered as having predeceased his victim and
the estate passes in its entirety to the victim's heirs.6 The murderer is
the survivor in fact, but not in contemplation of law. 2  The murderer and
his heirs are completely out of the picture. They take nothing.
View III
The legal title passes to the murderer, or those who claim under him,
but equity will treat him as a constructive trustee because of the uncon-
scionable mode of its acquisition, and will compel him to convey it to
the heirs or next of kin of the deceased. 3a Although the crime was not
committed for the purpose of getting title, equity, acting in personam, will
compel the criminal to hold the acquired res as a constructive trustee
for the deceased's heirs.0 4  However, where the murdered spouse was
older and had a life expectancy shorter than that of the murderer, it has
been held that the title vested in the murderer in fee as the survivor,
subject to a trust in favor of the victim's heir to the extent of the value
of the victim's half interest in the net income of the property for the
deceased's normal life expectancy., The constructive trust is purely a
remedial device employed by the courts in an attempt to prevent unjust
enrichment.66
A constructive trust is the fonnula through which the con-
55. Sorbello v. Mangino, 108 N.J. Eq. 292, 155 Atd. 6 (Ch. 1931).
56. Supra note 52.
57. Van Aistyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
58. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
59. Supra note 57.
60. In re Sparks' Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
61. In re Taylor's Estate, 34 Pa. D.&C. 551 (1934).
62. Supra note 57.
63. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
64. Ibid.
65. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 At]. 517 (Ch. 1933); Barnett v.
Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
66. SiNEs, Tausr AND Succtssioxs, 587 (1942).
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science of equity finds expression. When property has been
acquired in such circumstances that the holder of legal title may
not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity con-
verts him into a trustee.67
View IV
The murder severs the estate by the entirety. 8 The wilful dissolution
of the marital relationship by the felonious act changes the status of the
parties. "  Instead of tenants by the entirety they become tenants in
common. 0 As such, each is entitled to a one-half undivided interest in
the estate.7t The killer, or his representatives, cannot assert the right of
complete ownership as a survivor,12 when he is merely a tenant in common.
'he effect is similar to that obtained when an estate by the entirety is
severed by a divorce of the parties."' Upon the divorce of one tenant by
the entirety from the other, the divorced spouses each retain a one-half
undivided interest.7 4 Upon the murder of one tenant by another, a one-
half undivided interest is vested in the heirs of the deceased and a one-half
undivided interest remains in the survivor? 5 There is one infinitessimal
difference between the two situations - in the latter, someone has been
murdered. It is difficult to draw an analogy between a divorcing spouse
and a murdering spouse, yet both arc treated in the same manner in
jurisdictions following this view.
'tNIW FLORIDA VIEW
Florida has a provision precluding a murderer from inheriting fronl
his slain decedent:
Any person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not
be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to take any portion of
his estate as a legatee or devisee. The portion of the decedent's
estate to which such murderer would otherwise be entitled shall
pass to the persons entitled thereto as though such murderer had
died during the lifetime of the decedent. 1
The guilt of the murderer must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.7
However, this section is not applicable to a murdering spouse insofar as
property held as an estate by the entirety is concerned? 8  Once the
entirety is created, certain representative features arise.'9  The husband
67. Mr. Justice Cardozo in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exporation Co., 225 N. Y. 380,
386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919).
68. Hogan v. Martin, 52 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1951); Ashwood v. Patterson, 49
So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951).
69. Comment, 5 MIAMI L. Q. 592 (1951).
70. Ibid.
71. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951).
72. Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 917, 27 S.W.2d 757, 761 (1930).
73. Supra note 69.
74. Hogan v. Martin, 52 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1951); Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla.
654, 21 So.Zd 205 (1945).
75. Supra note 68.
76. FLA. STAT. § 731.31 (1951).
77. Peeples v. Corbett, 117 Fla. 213, 157 So. 510 (1934).
78. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951).
79. 2 BL. COMM. *182.
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and wife become one person in contemplation of law.80 Each spouse is
seized of the whole and does not take a divisible part.8 ' Upon the death
of either party, by operation of law the estate remains in the surviving
spouse, to the exclusion of the heirs of the deceased.8 2  The survivor does
not take by inheritance, or even by the usual method of survivorship.13
The survivor holds the entire estate by virtue of the original title.84 The
title of the survivor dates, not from the death of the spouse, but rather
from the date of the original conveyance." '
The Florida courts present an interesting approach to the effect of
murder upon an estate by the entirety. They do not grant the murderer
free and clear title to the estate; nor do they deprive him of it. Neither do
they give rise to a constructive trust in favor of the deceased's heirs. The
decisions of the Florida courts follow those handed down by the courts of
Missouri. 8  They form the fourth category of decisions as mentioned
above. By operation of law, upon the death of one spouse, the survivor
of an estate by the entirety is entitled to the whole estate.87 There is a
basic prerequisite, however, that the death contemplated in the laws on
estates by the entirety must be "in the ordinary course of events and subject
only to vicissitudes of life."88 Needless to say, murder is never considered
ordinary in a legal sense. Therefore, the husband (or wife) is the survivor
in fact, but not in contemplation of law.89  The act of murder is treated
as a wilful severance of the marriage.'"° In a divorce, there is also a wilful
severance of the marriage followed by a consequent change of the estate
by the entirety into a tenancy in common.'" Therefore, the following
rule has been introduced. Where one spouse, by a wilful (and felonious)
act, dissolves the marital relationship, and, as a consequence, there is a
severance of the estate by the entirety, such property is treated as a
tenancy in common."
A STATUTORY SOLUTION
The most direct approach to the problem presented here would be
80. Comment, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 592 (1951).
81. Knapp v. Fredricksen, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So.2d 251 (1941).
82. Miller v. Mobley, 136 Fla. 351, 186 So. 797 (1939); Menendez v. Rodriguez,
106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932).
83. Palm Beach Estates v. Croker. 106 1Ia. 617, 143 So. 792 (1932).
84. Bailey v. Bailey, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925); English v. English, 66
Fla. 427, 63 So. 822 (1913).
85. Supra note 80.
86. Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. App. 874, 211 S.V.2d 464 (1948); Barnett v.
Cotey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
87. Miller v. Mobley, 136 Fla. 351, 186 So. 797 (1939).
88. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951).
89. Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
90. Ilogan v. Martin, 52 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1951); Comment, 5 MIMI L. Q. 592
(1951); 6 Wyo. L.J. 266 (1952).
91. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1949); Andrews v. Andrews, 155 la. 654, 21 So.2d
205 (1945).
92. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Note, 14 U. DETROIT L. f.
147 (1951); Note, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 273 (1951).
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by statute. Having such a statute, the equitable constructive trust would
not be necessary. It has been suggested that a uniform statute be enacted 98
for the purpose of preventing ". . . the acquisition of any property or
benefit by one who has wilfully and unlawfully killed another, as the
result of the death of such other, and to provide for the disposition of
such property.""4  "Wilfully and unlawfully" would limit the crime to
murder, but should a conviction of such murder be essential to invoke
the statute? What of the cases where the murderer dispatches his victim
and immediately thereafter commits suicide?"" Should this situation be
considered without the statute? The common law doctrine applies to
the murderer as well as those claiming under him.96 To require a convic-
tion would defeat the purpose of the statute in many instances. In those
states which do require convictions, proposed Section 14 would expedite
a great deal of litigation. It provides: "The record of his [the nmurderer's]
conviction of having wilfully and unlawfully killed the decedent shall be
admissible in evidence against a claimant of property in any civil action
arising under this Act."9 17 Heretofore, private litigants could not introduce
the record of criminal conviction in a civil case to establish the truth of
the facts on which the conviction was had.0 8  This proves a hardship in
many cases.99
Sections 3 and 4 of this proposed statute provide that the murderer
shall be considered to have predeceased the decedent.'. Statutes of
descent and distribution, dower rights, curtesy rights, rights of surviving
spouse, and testamentary dispositions shall be interpreted as though the
slayer died first.' 0' Section 5 considers the effect upon estates by the
entirety. -02  One half of the property held by the slayer and the decedent
shall pass upon the death of the decedent to his estate. The other half
shall be held by the slayer during his life subject to pass upon his death
to the estate of the decedent.1"3 An alternative provision is suggested for
those states in which the husband is entitled to possession, use and income
of the property: 10 4 If the wife is the slayer, one half shall pass upon the
93. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another---a Statutory
Solution, 49 HlAP. L. REv. 715 (1936).
94. Ed. at 753.
95. Varnes v. Cooper, 204 Ark. 118, 161 S.W.2d 8 (1942); In re Tarlo's Estate,
315 Pa. 321, 172 Atl. 139 (1934).
96. Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire Title By His Own Crime and Keep It?, 36Am. L. REC. (N.S.) 225 (1897).
97. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory
Solution, 49 llARv. L. REv. 715, 755 (1936).98. Sorbello v. Mangino, 108 N.J. Eq. 292, 155 At. 6 (Ch. 1931).
99. Kowalski v. Director General, 93 N.J.L. 340, 107 At. 477 (1919), af'd
96 N.J.L. 293, 114 At. 927 (1921); Goodwin v. Continental Casualty Co., 175
Okla. 469, 53 P.2d 241 (1936).
100. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-a Statutory
Solution, 49 HAv. L. REv. 715, 753 (1936).
101. Ibid.
102. Id. at 754.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
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death of the husband to his estate; the other half to be held by the wife
during her life and to pass upon her death to the estate of the husband. 10 5
If the husband is the slayer, he shall hold the property during his life and
it passes to the estate of his wife upon his death.'06
In response to those jurisdictions which cling to the idea that depriv-
ing the murderer of the inheritance or survivorship is punishment in addi-
tion to a criminal sentence, 0 7 the statute expressly states in Section 15:
"This Act shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be construed
broadly in order to effect the policy of this state that no person shall be
allowed to profit by his own wrong."'0 8  The final clause of the proffered
statute is a severability clause. 100  In the event that any one portion of
the statute might be declared unconstitutional, that part may be severed
from the statute without destroying the statute in its entirety.
The suggested statute appears to be a comprehensive panacea. It
considers all aspects of the enigma and adequately dispenses with them.
The Pennsylvania legislature has enacted a major part of the statute as
suggested by XVade."10 However, Section 5, dealing with estates by the
entirety, seems inconsistent with the avowed purpose of the Act. In
practical effect, the murderer, who is the surviving tenant by the entirety,
does acquire a substantial benefit by the death of his spouse. Before
such death, each was entitled to enjoy the whole and each had a chance
of survivorship and consequent acquisition of the whole. After the death
of the spouse, the survivor has eliminated the possibility of loss of interest
during his life. Moreover, he does not share current profits with any one.
Whatever practical benefit the murderer has obtained should be taken from
him, not merely from his heirs as suggested by this section. The suc-
cessors of the deceased spouse should come into the full benefit of the
entire estate, exclusive of either the murderer or his heirs.
AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION
In the absence of a comprehensive statute, there is a secondary
approach to the problem through the courts of equity. Equity, in its
broadest and most general sense denotes ". . . the spirit and the habit of
fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse
of men with men . . .; or, as it is expressed by Justinian,' 'to live honestly,
to harm nobody, to render to ever man his due.' It is therefore the
synonym of natural right or justice. But ill this sense its obligation is
ethical rather than jural, and ...(it) belong to the sphere of morals. It
is grounded in the precepts of the conscience, not in any sanction of
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.,2d 872 (1950).
108. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another - a Statutory
Solution, 49 I.AiRv. L. Rv. 715, 755 (1936).
109. Ibid.
110. PA. STAr. A.-;N. tit. 20, §§ 3441-3456 (1952).
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positive law."" 2 Equity is ". . . doing justice between parties where there
is no guidance or remedy in ...law; .... ."13 The principles of equity
are extensive and relatively unencumbered. Justice is the high point; not
conformity with written law or stare decisis. For example:
if one obtains a deed or will by misrepresentation, duress,
or undue influence, the conveyor or his innocent successors in
interest can admittedly obtain a decree from equity that the
conveyee is a constructive trustee. In the case at hand the mur-
derer has by his own criminal conduct put into motion the forces
of the law which caused the title to move from the intestate or
testator to himself (the murderer). By his own felonious act he
caused the death of his benefactor, and that death brought into
play the laws of intestacy or the will. 1 14
The theory of constructive trust as a solution to the question of the
murderer's inheritance has been propounded by some courts of equity. 115 It
has been advocated by a number of legal authors."' This proposal avoids
the reproach of permitting the criminal to profit from his iniquitous act.
It also averts the censure of evasion of statutes of wills and descent or
distribution. Legally, the title vests in the one designated by will, by
succession, or by operation of law (as in an estate by the entirety).
Equitably, the use and enjoyment of the estate is removed from the
criminal and conveyed to thosi who would take if the slayer were dis-
qualified. In the case of an estate by the entirety, the legal title vests in
the murderer as the survivor in fact, but he is deprived of its benefits. In
this manner, the common law and civil law tenets that no man shall profit
by his own wrong transcends statutory complications and finds its satis-
faction in equity.
If the principles of equity could be embodied in statutory garb, we
would have the ideal solution - a solution which would bar a murderer
from taking any advantage whatsoever from a felonious killing. Degrees
of homicide, proof of the killer's intent to benefit from the crime, and
the necessity of conviction are severe hindrances to arriving at an equitable
solution. They are detours supplied by those who are unsure of their
right to invoke justice. If the murder is wilful and felonious, the murderer
and his heirs should be excluded from the deceased's estate whether by
testamentary disposition, intestate succession, or as surviving spouse. If we
consider the murderer as having predeceased the decedent, the legal title
112. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 634 (4th ed. 1951).
113. WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC DiCTIONARY 256 (1941).
114. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478 (1935).
115. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (Ch. 1933); Bryant v.
Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
116. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478 (1935); 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND
R'rUSTEES § 183a (7th ed. 1929); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 598 (2d ed. 1920);
Comment, 30 HARV. L. REv. 622 (1917); Comment, 29 Micn. L. REV. 745 (1931);
Note, 44 Huv. L. Rev. 125 (1930); Note, 9 ILL. L. REv. 505 (1915); Note, 64
U. OF PA. L. REv, 307 (1916).
C6MMENTS
never vests in the murderer so that there can be no cry of "forfeiture".
Give the "strict constructionists" a statute they can construe in only
one manner - a statute that answers the query: "Can a murderer acquire
property by or as a consequence of his crime and keep it?" -r- in simple
terms subject to a single interpretation -- "No!"
ESTELLE L. ACUE
SECURITY INTERESTS - COMMERCIAL FINANCE COMPANIES
IN FLORIDA
IN'RODUCTION
Florida needs more commerce. Transportation and large-scale financ-
ing pose problems that seem best answered by small business, since this
type of enterprise is characterized by relatively light investment in fixed
assets, a high ratio of manpower to machinery, and individualized products
and services that do not compete on a price (including transportation)
basis alone.'
Small business often raises working capital by the sale of, or borrow-
ing on, current non-cash assets, i.e., the more liquid assets exclusive of
cash.2 Commercial finance companies are typical buyers or lenders in
such transactions.3 Discussed below are the legal positions of commercial
finance companies in Florida resulting from their acquiring interests (total
or security) in accounts receivable, inventory and chattel paper. 4
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
Seventy years ago, the Florida Supreme Court held the assignment
of a book account valid in equity.5 There can be little doubt of the
assignability of accounts receivable today.6 Furthermore, by statute, "Any
civil action at law may be maintained in the name of the real party in
interest." There may be some doubt, however, as to whether the
assignor is a necessary party plaintiff in a suit upon a partial assignment.8
An account receivable involves two major risks: (1) the solvency
1. DxKs AND HoPnNs, PRIVATE CAPITAL RgQUIEEMENTS 46-48 53-56 (Board of
Covernors of the Federal Reserve System, Postwar Economic Studies, go. 5, 1946).
2. Id. at 71. This is probably for at least two principal reasons: sheer lack of
other assets to borrow on, and the rough correlation between the amount of current non-
cash assets and the amount of business activity.
3. They are not the only financial institutions in the field, however.
4. The scope of this discussion was suggested by SEIDMAN, FINANCE COMPANIES AND
FACToRS (National Conference of Commercial Receivable Companies, New York, 1949).
In fact, this comment is really an application of the cited volume to the law of Florida,
omitting two chapters dealing with drop-shipments and with imports and exports. The
volume cited also provided valuable practical observations reflected throughout this paper.
5. Sammis v. L'Engle, 19 Fla. 800 (1883).
6. "Under the common law, a right of action, choses in action, future or contin-
gent interests, possible and existing estates or interest, were not assignable, but all of
these are now assignable by statute or in equity." Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65,
71, 33 So.2d 641, 644(1948).
7. FLA. STAT. §45.01 (1951); Smith v. Westcott, 34 Fla. 430, 16 So. 332 (1894)
(assignee of accounts and due bills).
8. See Robinson v. The Springfield Co., 21 Fla. 203, 217-219 (1885).
